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NEBULOUS LAW:  
USING SOFT LAW TO GIVE STRUCTURE TO 
THE AMORPHOUS RPO INDUSTRY 
KYLIE MCLAUGHLIN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine looking down at your smartphone and realizing  
that you cannot make phone calls or access the internet.   
A communications satellite enabling these functions on your 
cellphone has just been struck by a piece of uncontrolled space 
debris.  Now, imagine being in the aftermath of a natural disaster, 
and search and rescue teams do not know you and your family  
are missing or in distress.  A satellite within the International 
Satellite System for Search and Rescue has just run out of fuel.  
Finally, imagine trains, planes, and ships remaining in their 
stations, gates, and ports because each has lost navigation data 
about their intended routes.  A GPS satellite was just disabled by 
an antagonistic state’s anti-satellite technology. 
While each of these scenarios is drastic to say the least, they 
are not entirely unprecedented.  Satellites control nearly every 
facet of our technology-dependent society.  Any given satellite 
struck by space debris or low on fuel would create rippling 
consequences throughout civilization.  To combat such scenarios, 
governments and companies may turn to rendezvous and 
proximity operations (“RPOs”).  RPOs have many capabilities, but 
primarily, actors in space hope to use RPOs to remove space debris 
and refuel satellites.  These operations can alter and enhance  
the landscape of technological advancements here on Earth.  
Unfortunately, the same technology that is used in RPOs to clean 
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up outer space or replenish a satellite’s fuel could also be used  
to disable a satellite through anti-satellite operations.  Such a 
security risk is threatening the growth of the RPO industry,  
which in turn threatens the growth of technology on Earth.  To 
exacerbate the situation, only vague and outdated treaties govern 
outer space activities, none of which specifically address RPO rules 
and regulations. 
This Note argues that the nascent RPO industry should turn 
to soft law measures to regulate RPO use because soft law is more 
beneficial to the industry as compared to hard law.  Part I of this 
Note describes what exactly RPOs are and details why it is 
important to regulate the industry in one form or another.  This 
Part also delves into which treaties currently control outer space 
activities and discusses how these treaties are too broad to address 
issues that may arise with RPO use.  Lastly, this Part introduces 
the major players of the RPO industry that are collaborating to 
create a workable system of rules for the industry as a whole.  Part 
II of this Note details the differences between soft law and hard 
law and addresses the advantages and disadvantages of using soft 
law.  It also analyzes the Kimberley Process, which is a soft law 
method of addressing a major security issue resulting from the 
Blood Diamond Regime in Southern Africa.  Part III considers the 
advantages and disadvantages of the RPO industry using soft law 
to address its regulatory concerns and argues that soft law is more 
beneficial to the RPO industry than hard law.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. What are RPOs? 
RPOs are “orbital maneuvers in which two [space objects] 
arrive at the same orbit and approach at a close distance,” which 
can be followed by a docking procedure connecting the two space 
objects.1  RPOs are not new to outer space activities.  For example, 
RPOs have been used to help the Apollo astronauts land on the 
moon and transfer astronauts to and from space stations and space  
 
 
1 REBECCA REESMAN & ANDREW ROGERS, THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, 
GETTING IN YOUR SPACE: LEARNING FROM PAST RENDEZVOUS AND PROXIMITY 
OPERATIONS 2 (2018), https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/GettingInYour 
Space.pdf.  
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labs.2  New types of RPOs, such as on-orbit servicing and active 
debris removal, have the potential to transform the commercial 
and military landscape of outer space activities.  
First, on-orbit servicing can include refueling and repairing 
satellites.3  Traditionally, companies that design and launch 
satellites had to deal with the fact that “their investments could 
never be repaired or upgraded.”4  When a satellite runs out of fuel 
or breaks down, the satellite is either sent to the graveyard orbit 
22,400 miles above Earth or sent back to Earth.5  When it is sent 
back to Earth, it either burns in Earth’s atmosphere or it drops 
into the “Spacecraft Cemetery” of the Pacific Ocean.6  In the very 
near future, however, satellite owners can use RPOs to inspect, 
assist, and modify their on-orbit assets.7  This extends the life of 
existing assets and adds more value to their initial investment.8 
Refueling capabilities also give satellite owners the flexibility 
to launch smaller or half-empty satellites.9  Launching with the 
goal of refueling in the future grants cheaper access to space 
because it is less expensive to launch a smaller or half-empty 
satellite.10  RPOs ultimately will be used to drastically lower the 
cost of constructing and deploying satellites, while also elongating 
the lifespan of a satellite.11  
Second, RPOs can be used to help remove debris cluttering 
various orbits.12  “Active Debris Removal (ADR) is defined as the 
‘means to remove objects from orbit above and beyond the 
 
2 See Theresa Hitchens, Opening Remarks on Debris Removal/Rendezvous and 
Proximity Operations: Looking at Policy Implications 1 (available on the Secure  
World Foundation’s website, https://swfound.org/media/167942/openingremarks_ 
hitchens.pdf).  
3 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1 at 2–3. 
4 Todd Master, Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations 
(CONFERS), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, https://www.darpa. 
mil/program/consortium-for-execution-of-rendezvous-and-servicing-operations (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2020).  
5 See Where Do Old Satellites Go When They Die?, NASA SPACE PLACE, 
https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/spacecraft-graveyard/en/ (last updated June 28, 2019). 
6 See id. 
7 See Master, supra note 4. 
8 See Benjamin B. Reed, On-orbit Servicing and Refueling Concepts, NASA 
SATELLITE SERVICING CAPABILITIES OFFICE 7 (2015), https://asd.gsfc.nasa.gov/luvoir/ 
events/seminars/2015/Reed_ATLAST_17Jun2015.pdf. 
9 See id.  
10 See id. 
11 See Master, supra note 4. 
12 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 3. 
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currently-adopted mitigation measures.’ ”13  Active debris removal 
can include removing defunct satellites or loose spacecraft 
components before their orbits decay on their own.14  Also, on-orbit 
servicing is considered a form of debris removal, since what “was 
once technically non-functioning debris could be serviced back  
to functionality, thus actively removing it from classification  
as debris.”15  
Debris removal is integral to continuing operations in space 
and maintaining the safety and functionality of satellites.16  
Numerous satellites have stopped functioning in Earth’s orbit and 
experts often assume that collisions with space debris are to 
blame.17  Private companies and governments alike rely on active 
debris removal procedures to ensure their assets will function 
properly on-orbit.18  Without active debris removal, the debris 
orbiting Earth may become subject to the Kessler Syndrome, also 
known as the Cascade Effect.19  
The Kessler Syndrome hypothesizes that while debris initially 
orbits as larger objects, collisions leading to more fragmentation of 
debris will occur.20  Some experts take the dramatic view that this 
 
13 Major Marc G. Carns, Consent Not Required: Making the Case that Consent is 
Not Required Under Customary International Law for Removal of Outer Space Debris 
Smaller Than 10cm2, 77 A.F. L. REV. 173, 202 (2017) (quoting J.-C. Liou, An Active 
Debris Removal Parametric Study for LEO Environment Remediation, 47 ADVANCES 
IN SPACE RES. 1865, 1865 (2011)). 
14 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 3. 
15 Carns, supra note 13, at 202; see also Martin J. Losekamm et al., Legal and 
Political Implications of Future On-Orbit Servicing Missions, INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL 
FED’N 1, 3 (2015) (“A servicing spacecraft . . . may . . . refuel satellites that ran out of 
fuel but are otherwise functional, so that they regain their station-keeping and 
collision-avoidance capabilities.”). 
16 See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 306 (Routledge, 
1st ed. 2016). 
17 See id. at 306 n.131; see also Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 3 (“A servicing 
spacecraft could be used to deorbit larger pieces of debris, thereby reducing the 
probability of major future collisions.”). 
18 See Justin Moor, Note, “You’re Not Actually Going Into an Asteroid Field?” – 
The Threat of Man-Made Space Debris, and a Proposal to Extend Existing Law to 
Prevent It, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 245, 255–57 (2014). “Satellite telecommunications 
companies comprise a $180 billion-dollar-per-year global industry, and therefore 
damage to satellites could have major economic consequences. Apart from the loss of 
corporate revenues, losing telecom satellites harms the people who rely on them both 
in their career and in their lives.” Id. at 255. “Satellites are vital to modern military 
intelligence-gathering and navigation. Satellite-powered GPS guidance is vital to 
ensuring that guided missiles and bombs hit their targets.” Id. at 256.  
19 See id. at 257.  
20 See Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial 
Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637, 2637 (1978); 
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will eventually lead to “an impenetrable cloud of fragmentation 
debris that will encase Earth.”21  If this comes to fruition, such a 
cloud of debris could make space travel nearly impossible.22  
However, the Kessler Syndrome is more likely to result in less 
severe, but still dire, consequences.23  Such consequences include 
heightened costs to satellite owners to undertake “collision 
avoidance maneuvers” to save their assets.24  The United States 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) 
reported that the International Space Station needed to take 
avoidance measures twenty-five times by 2015.25  Further, the 
European Space Association reported that “one of its ten [low 
Earth orbit] satellites receive[s] a ‘high-risk collision alert every 
week on average’ ” and must maneuver away from the hazards at 
least once or twice each year.26  These collision avoidance measures 
require satellites to expend fuel that they cannot replenish under 
existing technology.27  RPOs, of course, could be used to refuel 
satellites after these maneuvers.28  RPOs could also preempt the 
need to refuel satellites in such situations by clearing enough 
debris, thereby limiting the need to perform avoidance 
maneuvers.29 
Despite the benefits of using RPOs to repair and refuel 
satellites and clear debris, there are many issues that can arise 
with the use of RPOs.  Primarily, actors in space are concerned 
with security risks.  “Widespread use of rendezvous and  
proximity operations is a concern for the national security 
community because the technologies and operational techniques 
 
see also Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a 
Market-Share Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 132 (2000). 
21 Sundahl, supra note 20; see also Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 3 (“[The 
Kessler syndrome] would render large portions of the currently populated orbital 
bands unusable once the rate of debris creation exceeds that of natural atmospheric 
cleansing.”). 
22 See Moor, supra note 18, at 257. 
23 See Humaid Alshamsi et al., As the Grapefruit Turns Sixty, It’s Time to Get 
Serious About Clean Up in Outer Space, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 45, 51–52 (2018). 
24 Id. at 51 (quoting Two More Collision Avoidance Maneuvers for the 
International Space Station, ORBITAL DEBRIS QUARTERLY NEWS, Oct. 2015, at 1). 
25 See id. (citing Two More Collision Avoidance Maneuvers for the International 
Space Station, supra note 24). 
26 Id. (quoting Space Debris Problem Getting Worse, Say Scientists,  
PHYS.ORG (Apr. 18, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-04-space-debris-problem-
worse-scientists.html). 
27 Id. at 62. 
28 Id. at 52–53. 
29 See id. at 51, 53. 
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are essentially the same as those needed for anti-satellite (ASAT) 
operations.”30  An ASAT “weapon destroys or interferes with 
satellites, impeding a nation’s ability to collect intelligence or 
direct attacks.”31  Many states rely on satellites for military and 
civilian purposes, creating a vulnerability for rivals to prey upon.32  
“Potential adversaries, aware of the technology patterns of the 
United States (and other [states]), have come to appreciate the 
suggestion that satellites may now be the Achilles heel of the 
American civilian economy and its mighty military apparatus.”33  
An attack on such satellites could cripple a state’s military 
prowess and civilian economy, quickly granting the attacker a 
“crippling advantage.”34 
RPOs are essential in ensuring satellites can be repaired and 
refueled and are integral in removing hazardous space debris.35  
The future of space travel will be altered greatly with the use of 
RPOs.36  But the security risks associated with RPO use could 
potentially hinder the growth of this industry.37  Thus, it is 
imperative that the international community create rules and 
regulations governing the use of RPOs in outer space.38 
B. Lack of International Regulations for the RPO Industry 
Currently, there are various international treaties regulating 
space activities generally, but none of the treaties specifically 
address RPOs.39  There are five treaties concerning outer space 
regulation: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Rescue Agreement 
of 1968, the Liability Convention of 1972, the Registration 
Convention of 1976, and the Moon Treaty of 1979.  Only two of  
 
 
30 JAMES A. VEDDA & PETER L. HAYS, THE MITCHELL INST. FOR AEROSPACE 
STUDIES & THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, MAJOR POLICY ISSUES IN EVOLVING 
GLOBAL SPACE OPERATIONS 44 (2018), https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-
05/Space_Policy_FINAL_interactive_0.pdf.  
31 See Carin Zissis, China’s Anti-Satellite Test, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(Feb 22, 2007), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test. 
32 See David A. Koplow, The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in 
Outer Space, 59 HARV. INT’L L. J. 331, 337 (2018) (“Over time, therefore, the modern 
‘use’ of satellites has evolved into a ‘reliance’ upon them, which has graduated into a 
‘dependence,’ and eventually generated a ‘vulnerability.’ ”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
36 See id. at 10. 
37 See id.  
38 See id. 
39 See Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5. 
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these five have the potential to regulate RPO use in a general 
sense: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Liability 
Convention of 1972.40 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 contains various articles that 
can potentially be applied to RPO use.41  First, Article VI orders 
that “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international 
responsibility for national activities in outer space, . . . whether 
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by 
non-governmental entities.”42  Further, Article VI dictates  
that “[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in outer 
space . . . shall require authorization and continuing supervision 
by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”43  Under this article, 
it is likely that a certain state would be required to take 
international responsibility for any mishaps during an operation 
and that RPO usage would have to be approved and supervised by 
such state.44 
Second, Article VIII maintains that “[a] State Party to the 
Treaty on whose registry an object is launched into outer space is 
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object . . . .”45  
This provision “grants perpetual ownership of space objects to 
their launching state, even after the objects are deactivated and 
become uncontrolled junk.”46  In order to remove debris from 
Earth’s orbit, RPO industry members will likely have to get 
permission from the launching state of every piece of debris in 
outer space before removing it.47  “This would make removal efforts 
even more costly and time-consuming, and possibly transform 
such efforts into another arena for international politics.”48 
 
 
 
40 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4; see also Losekamm et al., supra 
note 15, at 5. 
41 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4; see also Losekamm et al., supra 
note 15, at 5. 
42 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI, opened for 
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space 
Treaty].  
43 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. VI. 
44 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4. 
45 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. VIII. 
46 VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 30, at 22. 
47 See Moor, supra note 18, at 264–65. 
48 Moor, supra note 18, at 265–66 (“A country could, for instance, only allow other 
states to remove its space debris if they made certain political concessions.”). 
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Third, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty dictates: 
A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an 
activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer 
space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with 
activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space . . . may request consultation concerning the activity or 
experiment.49 
The treaty does not define the term “harmful interference,” 
and there is no generally accepted definition of this term.50  
However, Article IX could apply to RPOs because the technologies 
for RPO use are the same as those needed for ASAT operations.51  
States would likely consider ASAT operations to constitute 
“harmful interference” for the purposes of interpreting the Outer 
Space Treaty.52  Thus, if any state thought that another state’s 
RPO was being used for an anti-satellite purpose, it would likely 
act pursuant to this article and request consultation.  “Without 
[such] diplomacy, it is not always easy to differentiate normal 
operations . . . from precursors to war.”53  However, this clause 
“does not provide a veto over any state’s activities; rather, it simply 
requires ‘consultations.’ ”54  Not all hope is lost though; if a state 
anticipated a potentially harmful interference by another state, it 
could invoke Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which 
requires Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force 
against another state.55 
Fourth, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty declares that a 
state that launches or procures the launching of an object into 
outer space (the “launching State”)56 is liable for the object or its 
 
49 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. IX. 
50 See Christopher D. Williams, Comment, Space: The Cluttered Frontier, 60 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 1139, 1156 (1995). 
51 VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 30, at 44. 
52 See Williams, supra note 50, at 1157. 
53 SAMUEL BLACK, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE 
WITH SPACE OBJECTS: THE KEY TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING 2 (2008). 
54 Williams, supra note 50, at 1157. 
55 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.”). 
56 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. 
I, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter 
Liability Convention]; (defining a “launching State” as “[a] State which launches or 
procures the launching of a space object” or “[a] State from whose territory or facility 
a space object is launched”). 
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component parts in air or in outer space.57  Additionally, the 
Liability Convention of 1972 “expand[ed] upon the principles of 
liability for damage caused by space objects introduced in Article 
VII.”58  For example, Articles II, III, and V of the Liability 
Convention expand the potential liability of “launching States” by 
establishing that they are strictly liable for all accidents on the 
surface of the Earth.59  Also, Article IV of the Liability Convention 
uses fault-based liability for accidents not occurring on the surface 
of the Earth.60  Mishaps involving RPOs would likely be  
covered by Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability 
Convention, but again, neither treaty specifically addresses  
these operations.61 
These two treaties, along with the three other international 
treaties regulating space activities, were “originally created with 
state civilian or military actors in mind and therefore lack[]  
the specificity and legal certainty that is necessary for  
mature commercial activities.”62  Private actors and private space 
activities were not anticipated when these treaties were 
introduced and adopted.63  Specifically, the Outer Space Treaty is 
 
57 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. VII (“Each State Party to the 
Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or 
facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State 
Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its 
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies.”); see also REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4. 
58 REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4. 
59 See Liability Convention, supra note 56, at arts. II, III & V; Adrian Taghdiri, 
Note, Flags of Convenience and the Commercial Space Flight Industry: The 
Inadequacy of Current International Law to Address the Opportune Registration of 
Space Vehicles in Flag States, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 405, 412–13 (2013); see also 
Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5 (“Articles II, III, and V of the Liability Convention 
state that the state actors launching an object into outer space shall jointly retain 
absolute liability for any damage caused on Earth, to aircraft, or to a space object of 
another launching state.”). 
60 See Liability Convention, supra note 56, at art. IV; see also Taghdiri, supra note 
59, at 412–13; Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5 (“According to Article IV, in the 
event of ‘damage being caused […] to a space object of one launching state […] by a 
space object of another launching State, and of damage thereby being caused to a third 
State […], the first two States shall be jointly and severally liable’ only if the damage 
was caused culpably.” (alterations in original)). 
61 See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4. 
62 Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5. 
63 See id.; David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as 
the “Province of All Mankind,” 25 YALE J. INT’L. L. 145, 157 (2000) (“The five space 
treaties were not formulated to address, and did not foresee, the complex problems of 
space pollution we face in the twenty-first century.”). 
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“a product of the Cold War and primarily addresses concerns of 
that era, including nuclear war.”64  The treaty’s entire existence 
“has prevented belligerent nations from putting weapons of mass 
destruction into space.”65 
Because all the relevant international law regulating space 
activities was not created with private actors in mind, it is 
questionable if these treaties can effectively regulate private space 
activities such as RPOs.66  Ideally, modern international  
treaties could be enacted to regulate the private sector.   
However, multilateral treaties require a long, arduous process of 
decision-making among a growing number of space-faring states.67  
This lowers the likelihood of a new treaty being created or  
of new provisions being added to existing treaties.68  Further, 
technological advancements by the private sector consistently 
outpace the rate at which international agreements can be 
enacted.69  “[T]he lack of clear, widely accepted technical and 
safety standards for responsible performance of on-orbit activities 
involving commercial satellites” presents a major roadblock to this 
industry.70  Absent such regulation, the future of outer space 
operations is in jeopardy.71 
 
64 Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can It Survive the New Space 
Race?, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
outer_space_treaty.  
65 Id.; see also Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 6 (“Possible interpretations of 
existing treaties and agreements constitute legal barriers that present a hindrance to 
the evolution of the global space community in general, and the private sector in 
particular.”) 
66 See Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5; see also Brian Weeden et al., 
International Perspectives on On-orbit Servicing and Active Debris Removal and 
Recommendations for a Sustainable Path Forward, SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 6–8 
(Sept. 2013), https://swfound.org/media/119604/iac-13-e3.4.7-presentation.pdf.  
67 See Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 8. 
68 See id. (“The discrepancies of political perspectives, and the required consensus 
in the decision-making process of COPOUS, make it almost impossible for its member 
states to agree on new provisions [for treaties]. The growing number of participating 
states exacerbates this situation even more.”). 
69 See id. at 9; Jeff Foust, Trump Administration Continues Support of Outer 
Space Norms of Behavior, SPACENEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://spacenews.com/trump-
administration-continues-support-of-outer-space-norms-of-behavior/; see also Debra 
Werner, DARPA To Establish Satellite-Servicing Consortium to Discuss On-Orbit 
Repair Standards, SPACENEWS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://spacenews.com/darpa-to-
establish-satellite-servicing-consortium-to-discuss-on-orbit-repair-standards/. 
70 Master, supra note 4. 
71 See id.  
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C. Major Players Working to Resolve Issues with RPO Use 
To compensate for a lack of relevant international law and to 
overcome these property and security concerns, private and public 
actors are collaborating to create a more uniform system of 
normative behavior regarding private space activity and RPOs 
specifically.72  One such actor is the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (“DARPA”), which is “an advanced-technology 
branch of the U.S. Department of Defense.”73  “The purpose of the 
agency is to try out new technologies and make them operationally 
ready, if possible, and to reach beyond current military technology 
to do something new.”74 
DARPA has organized the Consortium for Execution of 
Rendezvous and Servicing operations, called CONFERS.75  The 
goal of this organization is to “bring[] together companies involved 
in satellite servicing to define best practices and develop voluntary 
consensus-driven standards” for RPO missions.76  Using the best 
practices from both government and industry leaders, CONFERS 
will research, develop, and publish nonbinding technical and 
safety standards for the RPO industry.77  These standards will 
likely be adopted by servicing providers and clients for on-orbit 
servicing operations.78  “[This] program would provide a clear 
technical basis for definitions and expectations of responsible 
behavior in outer space.”79 
However, such goals require transparency about “engineering 
and design criteria, operational issues and information sharing 
practices for proximity operations and satellite servicing.”80  “Data 
exchange, while essential for these activities, will pose challenges 
due to national export controls and corporate concerns about 
protecting proprietary information . . . .”81  DARPA hopes to 
protect commercial participants’ financial and strategic interests 
by making the standards broad enough to allow companies to 
 
72 See Debra Werner, DARPA Working Group Begins Addressing Concerns 
Related to Proximity Operations and Satellite Servicing, SPACENEWS (May 23, 2018), 
https://spacenews.com/darpa-group-addresses-security-concerns/. 
73 See Elizabeth Howell, What Is DARPA?, SPACE.COM (Apr. 30, 2015), 
www.space.com/29273-what-is-darpa.html. 
74 Id. 
75 See Werner, supra note 72. 
76 Id.; see also Master, supra note 4. 
77 See Master, supra note 4. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. 
80 See Werner, supra note 72. 
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implement them “to suit their individual businesses.”82   
By creating consensus-driven standards, CONFERS can reduce 
the financial, regulatory, and diplomatic risks associated with 
RPO use.83 
In conjunction with DARPA, industry leaders are 
collaborating through CONFERS to ensure that there is a more 
uniform set of norms for RPO missions: Advanced Technology 
International is the CONFERS prime contractor working to 
coordinate and execute the most innovative research initiatives 
surrounding RPO technology;84 “Secure World Foundation directs 
outreach and engagement”;85 “USC’s Engineering Research Center 
is investigating existing standards and practices”;86 and “[t]he 
Space Infrastructure Foundation leads efforts to create new 
standards.”87  These efforts by DARPA and other industry leaders, 
again, are only creating best practices standards upon which the 
industry can rely.  These standards are not legally binding and 
offer no recourse for any actors that stray from such norms—the 
standards are voluntary.88  CONFERS realizing its end goal 
hinges on the space-faring community accepting soft law measures 
as opposed to implementing treaties—or other hard law measures. 
II. THE SOFT LAW APPROACH 
A. What is Soft Law? 
When interpreting and applying international law, there are 
two different types of law to consider: hard law and soft law.89  The 
Outer Space Treaty is an example of hard law—a law negotiated 
and created between space-faring states to prevent Cold War 
antics from reaching outer space.90  Soft law, on the other hand, is 
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a means of further explaining vague concepts in a treaty and 
“giving more direction on interpreting and renovating the hard 
law.”91  Essentially, it is a set of principles and policies established 
by various actors to deal with specific issues that hard law has  
not settled.92 
Unlike hard law, soft law does not limit the power to enter 
into international agreements to state actors alone.93  Nonstate 
actors, such as businesses and industry leaders, may be involved 
with creating soft law.  Also, soft law differs from hard law in that 
actors opting for soft law alternatives do not intend to be bound by 
international law.94  Rather, soft law “create[s] imprecise 
obligations under which a wide range of activity might be 
considered compliant.”95  Scholars also consider soft law as an 
instrument used to “represent promises that . . . create 
expectations about future conduct.”96 
Sometimes, soft law serves as a placeholder in the 
development of international law, which can later turn into 
treaties.97  Because treaty-making is a difficult and lengthy 
endeavor, soft law is often a suitable alternative under which 
industry actors and states can operate for the time being.98  
Further, “[a]lthough soft law is nonbinding, it may lead to 
compliance with its standards . . . [which] gives rise to new 
customary international law rules.”99  Customary international 
law is comprised of two elements: general and consistent practice 
by states—state practice, and practice followed out of a belief of 
legal obligation—opinio juris.100  “[C]ustom is generally binding 
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except for the limited and contentious persistent objector rule.”101  
In the form of customary international law, soft law can become 
binding on the international community.102  Thus, soft law has the 
potential to be as obligatory as hard law.103 
B. Advantages of Soft Law 
Because soft law is such a flexible system, there are many 
benefits to having soft law influence international law.  First and 
foremost, creating hard law is becoming a less attractive goal.104  
“[M]any countries do not support the creation of new treaties on 
[outer space regulation].”105  The United Nations’s Legal 
Subcommittee is not likely to start making new treaties governing 
outer space because it wants to avoid debates on already-decided 
issues and the long process of treaty-making.106  Also, “it may be 
easier for some states to adhere to nonbinding instruments 
because they can avoid the domestic treaty ratification process, 
and perhaps escape democratic accountability . . . for the policy to 
which they have agreed.”107  Thus, when there is a lack of political 
will to create treaties, soft law can be used to create principles and 
policies in a given subject area. 
Second, many non-space-faring nations have not signed on to 
existing treaties governing outer space, despite the importance of 
international harmony with respect to the law.108  Those treaties 
were drafted to “focus on traditional space security concerns, 
which are different from the critical security concerns today.”109  
Thus, the nonsigning states do not see the upside of being legally 
bound to such outdated treaties.110  On the contrary, using “soft 
law instruments enables states to agree to more detailed and 
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precise provisions because their legal commitment, and the 
consequences of any non-compliance, are more limited.”111  Thus, 
nonbinding soft law may be the only way to create a uniform set of 
rules for every nation to follow—even non-space-faring nations, if 
and when they enter outer space.112 
Third, “soft law is a better way to handle the always-changing 
technology that will undoubtedly be used in outer space.”113  Under 
a soft law regime, technological advancements will not be deterred 
or slowed due to the need to comply with a binding treaty.114  State 
and nonstate actors can be more ambitious with technology and 
engage in deeper cooperation with other actors than they would if 
they had to worry about enforcement.115  “Soft law instruments 
provide greater flexibility for states to cope with uncertainty [with 
technology] and learn over time.”116  Soft law ultimately helps spur 
creativity within industries involved in outer space technology.117 
Fourth, both state and nonstate actors are able to participate 
in creating soft law principles.  Any effective regulatory strategy 
must respond to the affected community’s concerns by “reacting 
quickly and appropriately whe[n] new information comes to 
light.”118  In order to react quickly and appropriately to new 
information, the private enterprises of the community need to be 
involved in the regulatory scheme.119  State-centered regulations 
often can be ineffective because private enterprises hold much of 
the information about and expertise in new technology rather than 
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the state.120  For regulations to be effective, there needs to be 
information sharing between state and nonstate actors, which 
such actors can achieve more easily under a soft law regime—hard 
law only requires state actors to be involved.121 
Ultimately, soft law is an adaptable way to manage both state 
and nonstate actors operating in outer space.  Soft law limits the 
need for hard law, given the difficulties associated with 
treaty-making, the technological changes associated with outer 
space activities, and the necessity of having nonstate actors 
involved in policy-making.  That is not to say, however, that soft 
law does not come with its own disadvantages. 
C. Disadvantages of Soft Law 
While beneficial in many instances, soft law lacks many 
aspects that make hard law more attractive to actors in outer 
space.  First, soft law lacks credibility.122  Hard law requires 
codification of legally-binding obligations to which states subject 
themselves.123  Treaties, in particular, show the international 
community that the signing states intend to commit themselves to 
the agreement.124  “They make state commitments more credible 
because they increase the cost of reneging, whether on account of 
legal sanctions or on account of the costs to a state’s reputation 
where it is found to have violated its legal commitments.”125  
Further, treaties can either be self-executing, meaning that  
they have direct legal effects on national jurisdictions, or 
non-self-executing, meaning that they require domestic legal 
enactment.126  “Where treaty obligations are implemented through 
domestic legislation, they create new tools that mobilize domestic 
actors, increasing the audience costs of a violation and thus 
making their commitments more credible.”127  Thus, state and 
nonstate actors can be in breach of international obligations 
created by hard law, making it more credible than soft law. 
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Second, soft law lacks enforcement and punishment 
mechanisms.128  Under soft law, there usually are no means of 
enforcing the “law” and no means of punishing actors who violate 
the “law.”129  While actors involved with soft law mechanisms can 
bring problems and conflicts before an independent third party, 
this conciliatory method is non-binding.130  Oftentimes, hard law 
instruments allow states to bring disputes over their legal 
commitments to a dispute-settlement body such as a court, which 
is binding.131  Thus, hard law is much more enforceable than  
soft law. 
D. Soft Law in Practice: The Kimberley Process 
It is important to understand how soft law works when it is 
implemented in response to a major security issue.  One such 
example of this situation is the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme for Rough Diamonds.  Prior to the Kimberley Process, 
diamonds were “the currency and primary financing vehicle of 
rebel movements that brutalized innocent civilians.”132  By the 
1990s, the unregulated trade of diamonds was financing rebel 
groups in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 
Sierra Leone.133  In these countries, the rebel groups remained in 
control of the diamond mining regions.134  These groups used the 
proceeds to pay for weapons to wage “decades-long campaigns 
against unarmed civilians, perpetrating killings, rapes, 
mutilations, and abductions into their armies or sexual slavery.”135  
Over ten million people were killed or displaced due to these 
diamond-financed conflicts.136 
In response to these atrocities, various state and nonstate 
actors came together to address the problem of so-called “blood 
diamonds,”137 or “conflict diamonds.”  This coalition was comprised 
of countries in Southern Africa, companies involved in the 
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diamond trade, and human rights non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”).138  The African nations sought to quell the 
violence and salvage the diamond trade, the companies sought to 
avoid the boycott and collapse of the diamond industry, and the 
NGOs sought to focus public attention on the matter.139  “Rather 
than wholly ban the diamond trade, this group initiated the 
Kimberley Process, a global certification scheme designed to drive 
blood diamonds off the legal market.”140 
Generally, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is 
meant to bring together key stakeholders in the diamond trade, 
identify universal human rights goals for the trade, and  
devise a procedure by which these goals can be realized and by 
which the stakeholders can still profit from the industry.141  
Specifically, the institution supports the national regulation of 
diamonds based on minimum standards that have been 
internationally agreed upon.142  “All state participants must 
ensure that every raw diamond shipment contains a Kimberley 
Process certificate and that no shipment is imported from  
or exported to a non-participant.”143  Each participating state  
is expected to establish “a system of internal controls;  
utilize tamper-resistant containers; enact implementing and 
enforcement legislation; . . . share import and export data;” and 
“self-report on [its] relevant laws, regulations, and practices.”144  
Also, the process allows for nonstate actors—specifically 
companies and NGOs—to engage in voluntary self-regulation 
initiatives.145  This includes industry efforts to provide a warranty 
system where members commit to not knowingly buying or selling 
or helping others to buy or sell conflict diamonds.146  “The 
[Kimberley Process] does not constitute a binding international 
treaty; rather, it is more akin to an international political 
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agreement between nations, and thus, is largely self-enforced.”147  
As a soft law measure, the Kimberley Process provides a suitable 
platform on which the advantages and disadvantages of soft law 
can be examined more closely. 
Overall, the Kimberley Process is often lauded as “an 
exemplar for international action on humanitarian and security 
problems.”148  From the perspective of the diamond and jewelry 
industry, this process provides a sense of assurance that they are 
not selling conflict diamonds to their customers.149  Such a sense 
of assurance arises from the legitimacy of the process itself.150  The 
process was created by industry leaders, which implies that the 
process is practical and workable.151  “Unlike international arms 
embargoes or sanctions, which typically are created by states 
without the express involvement of the arms industry, the 
Kimberley Process’s legitimacy lies in large part with the fact that 
it is a product of the global diamond industry itself.”152 
Further, the Kimberley Process involves other measures that 
increase its legitimacy and efficacy.  First, participant states are 
obligated to “enact domestic legislation allowing for the imposition 
of the terms of the Kimberley Process, which will combat conflict 
diamonds within the participant’s jurisdiction.”153  Second, 
participant states can be delisted for violating the terms of the 
Kimberley Process.154  Being delisted means that diamonds cannot 
be legally imported or exported through the state, which, in turn, 
hurts the violating state’s economy. 155 
Further, the public punishment for violating the process 
incentivizes compliance by state and nonstate actors.156  After a 
state has been delisted, it can be reinstated once the particular  
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delisting issue has been resolved.157  This practice shows that the 
creators of the Kimberley Process are devoted to solving the 
inherent problem of conflict diamonds.158  
Despite the advantages of the soft law approach applied to the 
problem of conflict diamonds, the Kimberley process also presents 
some disadvantages.  The main issue with the process is that it 
relies too much on the states’ and companies’ ability to police 
themselves.159  Although the United Nations supports the creation 
and implementation of the Kimberley Process, there is no 
international monitoring body, meaning there are no legally 
binding compliance standards.160  The only truly binding 
requirements of the Kimberley Process are the pieces of domestic 
legislation passed by participating states.161  But even that 
legislation can experience sporadic enforcement by the 
participating state, unless the state is committed to monitoring 
through its domestic police power.162  This results in “inadequate, 
‘toothless’ monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are 
fundamentally flawed and ultimately ineffectual.”163  Scholars 
have argued for more oversight from and participation by the 
United Nations.164  The United Nations would have the power to 
sanction states that do not comply with the process, giving the 
Kimberley Process more teeth.165 
In connection with the lack of international oversight, the 
process “does not permit a private right of action whereby an 
individual can bring suit against another person or company 
violating the [Kimberley Process].”166  Such a private right of 
action would allow members of the industry to “more actively 
participate in the prevention of the blood diamond trade.”167  It 
would also create another “check” on the system.168  Lastly, the 
private right of action would deter people in the industry from 
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buying or selling conflict diamonds.169  It would serve as an 
incentive for participating states to stay committed to the 
Kimberley Process.170  
Overall, the Kimberley Process has mitigated many human 
rights abuses in the diamond industry.  As a soft law measure, the 
process has largely proved to be effective against such a major 
security issue, despite some disadvantages that may need to be 
addressed in the future.  The Kimberley Process’s advantages and 
disadvantages are applicable to the RPO industry because both 
situations involve security issues affecting both state and nonstate 
actors.  Thus, the RPO industry can reap the benefits of the soft 
law approach and preemptively address its drawbacks.  
III. ARGUMENT: SOFT LAW TO REGULATE THE RPO INDUSTRY 
A. Advantages of Using Soft Law to Regulate RPOs 
Soft law may be the best option to regulate RPO use because 
it is a more flexible system compared to hard law.  First, creating 
hard law is becoming a less attainable goal because many 
countries do not support the creation of new treaties regulating 
outer space activities.171  Further, the United Nations wants  
to avoid treaty negotiations because they can be very 
time-consuming and because states may want to renegotiate terms 
of prior treaties regulating outer space.172  With CONFERS using 
soft law to regulate RPOs, there is no need to create or negotiate 
any new treaty.  Actors involved with RPOs could still operate 
under existing treaties, while using soft law instruments created 
by CONFERS to interpret vague terms of the existing treaties.173  
Also, states will more readily agree to soft law measures because 
agreeing to non-binding measures has fewer political 
ramifications domestically than binding hard law.174  Thus,  
the lack of political will to create a new treaty will not prevent 
CONFERS and other actors from regulating RPOs with soft  
law measures. 
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Second, various non-space-faring states are not signatories to 
existing treaties governing outer space.175  The five treaties 
governing outer space were drafted in the Cold War era, when 
different security concerns existed than those that states are 
focused on today.176  The nonsigning states are not inclined to be 
legally bound to such outdated laws.177  Thus, soft law measures 
may be the only method of creating uniformity in RPO regulation.  
Space-faring and non-space-faring states can benefit from 
CONFERS creating soft law principles because such principles can 
be precise and detailed, compared to broad and vague treaties.178 
Third, soft law is a more effective way to handle the 
technological advancements associated with space activities.179  
With each new technological advancement, a state or nonstate 
actor might violate the terms of a binding treaty, unless new terms 
are drafted.  Acknowledging how difficult it is to create a treaty or 
renegotiate the terms of an existing treaty, hard law may stifle the 
RPO industry’s motivation to advance technology.  Under soft law 
measures, however, rules and regulations can be more easily 
adapted in light of new technology, and there is no penalty for 
“violating” soft law policies.180  This means that RPO industry 
members can defy soft law measures without fear of retribution 
when they develop new technology.181  CONFERS is currently led 
by DARPA, whose sole purpose is to create new technology for  
the United States military.182  CONFERS’s prime contractor is 
Advanced Technology International (“ATI”), which is working to 
coordinate and execute the most innovative research initiative 
surrounding RPO technology.183  These two actors are leading the 
charge for technological advancements regarding RPOs and 
CONFERS is enabling them to collaborate to push technological 
boundaries.184  Further, CONFERS’s policies can be altered as 
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technology changes because DARPA and ATI are two of the key 
policy-making actors within CONFERS.185  Soft law allows actors 
like DARPA and ATI to learn and experiment with technology 
without fear of penalty for violating policies.186 
Fourth, soft law allows nonstate actors to play an integral  
role in policy-making alongside state actors.187  For the most part, 
private enterprises have more information and expertise on  
new technology than state actors.188  Open communication and 
collaboration between state and nonstate actors are essential to 
the creation of effective regulations.189  CONFERS is the primary 
channel through which state actors, like DARPA, can collaborate 
with nonstate actors, like ATI, to create policies that facilitate 
technological growth.190  CONFERS has also recruited the Secure 
World Foundation to direct outreach to other actors to engage 
them in policy-making, University of Southern California’s 
Engineering Research Center to investigate current standards 
and practices surrounding RPO regulation, and the Space 
Infrastructure Foundation to lead efforts to create new 
standards.191  CONFERS, acting as a soft law platform, will likely 
produce effective policies and procedures that will be respected 
throughout the RPO industry because they will be created by the 
industry itself.192 
Overall, soft law is a malleable tool to give structure to the 
RPO industry.  CONFERS allows state and nonstate actors to 
collaborate and create policies and procedures that reflect the best 
practices of the RPO industry while inspiring technological 
growth.  Soft law is likely the preferred method of the industry 
given the lack of political will to create new treaties or for 
non-space-faring states to sign on to existing treaties.  While soft 
law is the advantageous method of creating regulations, it does 
have disadvantages that need to be addressed. 
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B. Disadvantages of Using Soft Law to Regulate RPOs 
While it is likely the preferred method of regulation for the 
RPO industry, soft law lacks many features of hard law that may 
make a treaty more attractive to actors in outer space.  First, one 
of the main features soft law lacks is credibility.193  Hard law 
requires codifying legally-binding obligations to which states 
subject themselves, showing that they intend to be bound by the 
terms of the agreement.194  Treaties make state commitments more 
credible because a breach would likely lead to sanctions or harm 
to the reneging state’s reputation.195  Further, nonstate actors can 
be in breach of a treaty if the treaty is self-executing, or if it’s 
non-self-executing but domestic legislation has been passed 
pursuant to the treaty.196 
However, in some circumstances, soft law can become binding 
customary international law.197  Customary international law is 
composed of state practice, which is a general and consistent 
practice by states, and opinio juris, which is a practice followed out 
of a belief of legal obligation.198  Once a soft law practice has been 
deemed to be so consistent and widely-practiced that it is now 
considered customary international law, it is as legally-binding 
and obligatory on state actors as a treaty.199  If CONFERS creates 
policies that enough space-faring states follow out of a sense of 
legal obligation, these policies can be obligatory customary 
international law on state actors.  Thus, soft law, in the form of 
customary international law regulating RPO use, eclipses the need 
and desire for a treaty on RPOs. 
However, customary international law is not binding  
on nonstate actors.  CONFERS can counteract this issue by 
implementing the delisting procedure as seen in the Kimberley 
Process.200  Where a nonstate actor forgoes soft law rules and 
regulations of RPO use, it can be delisted as a participating entity 
with CONFERS.  This would hurt the violator’s finances because 
fewer satellite owners would want to do business with that violator 
if they are not following protocol.  The economic incentive to 
 
193 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 115, at 718. 
194 See id. at 717. 
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197 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 94, at 157. 
198 See Roberts, supra note 100, at 757. 
199 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 94, at 157. 
200 See Harrington, supra note 149, at 361. 
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comply with soft law is comparable to the legal incentive to comply 
with hard law, making soft law as credible as a treaty.  Thus, soft 
law is an effective way to regulate RPO use.  
Second, soft law lacks enforcement and punishment 
mechanisms.  Under soft law, there often are no means of 
enforcing the “law” and no means of punishing actors who violate 
the “law,” while hard law instruments allow states to bring 
disputes over their legal commitments to a dispute-settlement 
body.201  Thus, hard law tends to be more enforceable than soft law.  
However, CONFERS can use other methods to enforce policies and 
punish actors that renege from agreed upon procedures. 
To enforce procedures, CONFERS can encourage participants 
to bring their issues to an independent third party.  Although this 
form of conciliation is nonbinding, actors involved in CONFERS 
might be willing to adhere to the third party’s findings  
and recommendations.  After all, CONFERS was created to give 
structure to this industry, so its participants will likely want to 
maintain the structure by following agreed upon policies and 
procedures.  However, if conciliation before an independent third 
party does not work, CONFERS can, again, borrow the Kimberley 
Process’s delisting procedure.  The economic risk associated with 
being delisted is likely high enough to keep actors from defying 
CONFERS’s policies. 
If both conciliation and delisting procedures are not enough to 
keep actors in line, the Liability Convention provides a means of 
bringing claims against states that cause damage in outer space 
and on the surface of the Earth.202  Any damage that may result 
from a violation of a soft law rule or regulation would then be 
actionable under this treaty.203  Thus, through a combination of 
soft law and hard law, RPO regulation is enforceable and 
punishable against state and nonstate actors under a delisting 
procedure and is enforceable and punishable against state actors 
under the Liability Convention.204 
 
201 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 115, at 718. 
202 See Liability Convention, supra note 56, at arts. II, III & V; Taghdiri, supra 
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V of the Liability Convention state that the state actors launching an object into outer 
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or to a space object of another launching state.”). 
203 See Liability Convention, supra note 56, at arts. II, III & V; Taghdiri, supra 
note 59, at 412–13; see also Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5.  
204 See Liability Convention, supra note 56, at arts. II, III & V; Taghdiri, supra 
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C. What CONFERS Can Learn from the Kimberley Process 
The Kimberley Process has proved to be an effective soft law 
measure in regulating the blood diamond regime.  CONFERS, or 
any other soft law mechanism, can learn from the benefits and 
detriments of the Kimberley Process because both the RPO 
industry and the blood diamond regime present major security 
issues that state and nonstate actors alike need to address.  
First, the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process is the main 
reason that it is effective in regulating the issue of conflict 
diamonds in Southern Africa.205  Both state and nonstate actors 
involved in eradicating the blood diamond regime have a sense of 
assurance that they are not importing and exporting blood 
diamonds or selling blood diamonds to their customers.206  This 
sense of assurance comes from the fact that the process was 
created by industry leaders.207  A process created by industry 
leaders implies that the process is “practical and workable.”208  
RPO industry leaders, through CONFERS, are collaborating 
to create practical and workable standards under which state and 
nonstate actors can operate.209  As demonstrated by the Kimberley 
Process, such an endeavor will likely lead to a sense of legitimacy 
and assurance that a treaty may not necessarily provide.  Treaties 
are created and implemented solely by states that might not ask 
nonstate actors that are more directly involved in the industry to 
engage in the treaty-making process.210  Therefore, there is a 
chance that a new treaty regulating RPO use may not incorporate 
the best practices and standards of the industry.211  Thus, a new 
treaty may not have the sense of legitimacy that policies created 
by CONFERS may have, because that “legitimacy lies in large part 
with the fact that it is a product of the . . . industry itself.”212 
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The Kimberley Process has other means that increase  
its legitimacy and efficacy.  Primarily, participant states are 
obligated to “enact domestic legislation allowing for the imposition 
of the terms of the Kimberley Process, which will combat conflict 
diamonds within the participant’s jurisdiction.”213  If CONFERS is 
successful in creating soft law policies, the industry leaders 
involved could require similar domestic legislation to ensure that 
the rules and regulations are being enforced.  This method could 
further obviate the need for a new multilateral treaty governing 
RPO use:  once state and nonstate actors are controlled by 
domestic law, they have a legal incentive to obey the international 
soft law measures.214 
Further, participant states of the Kimberley Process can be 
delisted for violating the terms of the process.215  Delisting can 
damage a violating state’s economy, because diamonds cannot be 
legally imported or exported through a delisted state—this 
increases the process’s validity.216  Such a public punishment for 
violation is a good incentive for state and nonstate actors to obey 
the soft law.217  Once a state has been delisted, it can be re-enlisted 
if the state remedies the issue that caused it to be delisted.218  
If the RPO industry turns to soft law measures for regulation, 
it too could use this delisting and re-enlisting process.  This 
method would likely prove to be an effective incentive for state and 
nonstate actors to obey the rules and regulations.  States would 
not want to be delisted because it would hurt their economy and it 
would publicly shame them.  Nonviolating states would likely 
distrust the violating state and would hesitate before conducting 
any joint space activity.  Further, nonstate actors would not want 
to be delisted because customers would likely hesitate before 
turning to them for satellite refueling and repairing missions.   
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This practice of delisting and re-enlisting would show that the 
creators of the soft law measure are devoted to solving the security 
issues associated with RPO use.219  
Ultimately, the Kimberley Process shows us that soft law is 
an adaptable way to manage both state and nonstate actors 
operating in outer space.  Soft law eradicates the need for hard 
law, especially in light of the difficulties associated with 
treaty-making, the technological advancements associated with 
RPOs, and the need to have nonstate actors involved in 
policy-making to make such policies effective.  The Kimberley 
Process, however, also demonstrates the disadvantages of soft law 
from which CONFERS can learn from the Process’s mistakes.  
The main issue with the Kimberley Process is that it relies 
heavily upon self-policing by both the states and the companies 
involved.220  Despite the support and approval of the United 
Nations, the Kimberley Process has no international monitoring 
body.221  Domestic legislation passed by participating states of the 
Kimberley Process is the only legally binding requirement of the 
process.222  But domestic legislation requires domestic enforcement 
with the state’s police power—this monitoring method can be 
irregular depending on the state.223  This results in inadequate  
and “toothless” monitoring, making the Kimberley Process 
somewhat ineffective.224  
To combat such a problem with RPO soft law regulation, 
CONFERS could request impartial oversight from the United 
Nations.225  The United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs 
(“UNOOSA”) has the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of  
Outer Space (“COPUOS”).226  This committee could further its 
monitoring reach to include monitoring soft law regulation of 
RPOs.  COPUOS, acting under the UNOOSA, would have power  
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to sanction states that do not comply with the soft law rules  
and regulations of RPO use, thereby giving RPO regulation  
more teeth.227 
In connection with the lack of international oversight, the 
Kimberley Process “does not permit a private right of action 
whereby an individual can bring suit against another person or 
company violating the [process].”228  A private right of action would 
incentivize industry members to more actively participate in 
eliminating the blood diamond trade out of fear of litigation, 
creating another “check” on the system.229  It would serve as an 
incentive for participating states to stay committed to the 
Kimberley Process.230  
RPO regulation through soft law cannot itself create a private 
right of action because soft law is inherently nonbinding.231  
However, the delisting process, again, would likely be incentive 
enough for state and nonstate actors to comply with RPO rules  
and regulations.  The economic risk of disobeying industry-wide 
regulations created by CONFERS would likely instill enough fear 
in businesses to comply with such regulations.  
If the threat of being delisted is not enough incentive, the 
Liability Convention could create a private right of action for state 
actors to seek relief.232  If an actor violates the soft law rules and 
regulations of RPO use, resulting in damage to another state’s 
property on the Earth’s surface or in outer space, then that 
damage could be actionable under the Liability Convention.233  
Although the Liability Convention only provides for claims 
between states, launching states are liable for outer space mishaps 
to nonstate actors.234  Thus, a state could get relief from another 
state for a nonstate actor’s damage.235  While the Kimberley  
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Process shows the downsides of using soft law, CONFERS can 
learn from the Process’s mistakes to make its own policies and 
procedures more effective. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, soft law has many advantages over hard law:  
soft law is easier to form compared to the treaty-making process 
required in hard law, non-space-faring nations are unwilling to 
join existing space treaties, soft law is a more malleable 
instrument for changing technologies as opposed to renegotiating 
treaties, and nonstate actors are more actively involved in creating 
soft law policies.  However, soft law does have some disadvantages 
compared to hard law: soft law is less credible than hard law 
because hard law requires codification of legally binding 
obligations, and soft law lacks enforcement and punishment 
mechanisms.  
The disadvantages of using soft law for RPO regulation can be 
mitigated.  CONFERS’s policies could become more credible if they 
are widespread and consistently used, which could convert the 
policies into binding customary international law.  Since 
customary international law is not binding on nonstate actors, 
CONFERS could further heighten the credibility of their policies 
by including a delisting and re-enlisting procedure, similar to the 
Kimberley Process, that would promote compliance.  To diminish 
the lack of enforcement and punishment mechanisms under soft 
law, CONFERS could encourage participants to use a conciliatory 
method and bring their issues to an independent third party.  If 
conciliation does not work, CONFERS could, again, utilize a 
delisting procedure to punish violating entities.  If delisting is not 
enough, the Liability Convention provides a right of action if a 
breach of RPO rules resulted in damage to a space object on 
Earth’s surface or in outer space.  
The Kimberley Process further demonstrates the benefits and 
detriments of a soft law system from which CONFERS and the 
RPO industry can learn.  The Kimberley Process demonstrates 
that using soft law to manage a security issue has its advantages 
over hard law: soft law integrates industry leaders, as opposed to 
just state actors, to create rules and regulations, which increases 
legitimacy; soft law creators can mandate domestic legislation 
pursuant to the rules and regulations, which increases 
compliance; and delisting and re-enlisting procedures can be 
enacted, which also increases compliance. 
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However, the Kimberley Process shows that there are some 
drawbacks in using soft law to regulate a security issue: soft law 
requires no international monitoring body, which limits 
compliance; and soft law does not provide a private right of action 
for any breach of the rules and regulations, which limits 
punishment.  CONFERS can learn from the Kimberley Process’s 
downfalls and implement more oversight to mitigate the 
disadvantages of this soft law process.  First, CONFERS could 
require domestic legislation to be passed in participating states 
pursuant to the soft law rules and regulation, making the rules 
and regulations binding on state and nonstate actors, which would 
increase compliance and punishment.  Second, CONFERS could 
request impartial oversight from the UNOOSA under the 
COPUOS, which also would increase compliance and punishment. 
Overall, soft law is the better method to manage RPO 
regulation.  Any drawbacks with soft law can be counteracted with 
varying solutions, as demonstrated by the Kimberley Process.  
Satellite owners would likely prefer to protect their assets with 
uniformly agreed upon rules that they helped create than continue 
with the lawlessness that currently exists.  Soft law is the most 
effective method to give such structure to the amorphous RPO 
industry.  
 
